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PRAGMATIC CONVENTIONALISM AND SPORT NORMATIVITY IN THE FACE OF 
7 





We build on Morgan’s deep conventionalist base by offering a pragmatic approach 
14 
15 (‘transitionalism’) for achieving normative progress on sports most intractable problems 
16 
17 (e.g. performance enhancement restrictions, collision sport dangers, competitive 
18 
19 
classification discord). Our account picks up where Morgan suggests disparate 
20 
21 
22 normative communities 'default' to inferior yet functionally 'pragmatic' resolutions to 
23 
24 conflict. Pragmatic resolutions, we contend, offer normative substance by providing the 
25 
26 means to move beyond intellectual stalemates by re-orientating our normative efforts 
27 
28 
relative to the three cornerstones of Morgan’s deep conventionalism: the nature and 
30 
31 status of different sporting conventions; the difference between conflicts of an 
32 
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45 The thoughtful reintroduction of ‘conventionalism’ into the sport philosophy literature by 
46 
47 Morgan (2012) aims at a ‘genuinely acute and incisive’ approach to ‘make critical sense of the 
48 
49 contemporary sport scene’ (p.89).  Morgan asserts that his socio-historical notion of ‘deep 
50 
51 
conventions’ provides a superior normative framework compared to the ‘too abstract, too far 
53 
54 removed’ Dworkian-inspired ‘realist’ principles championed by interpretivist-minded 


















3 philosophers of sport.  ‘Deep conventions’, Morgan writes, ‘are better suited [than interpretivist 
4 
5 
principles] to do heavy normative lifting precisely because of their social and historical 
7 
8 situatedness’ (p.66) and thus possess ‘the key to normatively perspicacious inquiry into sport’ 
9 
10 (p.79; emphasis added). 
11 
12 
Morgan’s socio-historical normative account has elicited several critical responses (e.g. 
14 
15 Ciomaga 2012; Lopez-Frias 2014; Russell 2018; Moore, 2018). Instead of adding to critiques of 
16 
17 the ‘philosophical veracity’ of Morgan’s account, we build out from a deep conventionalist base 
18 
19 
by offering a pragmatic approach for instrumentally achieving normative progress where Morgan 
20 
21 
22 suggests ‘rationality’ stalls. In particular, our pragmatist insights offer another reasoned way to 
23 
24 arrive at meaningful ‘working resolutions’ to intractable, complex, and wide-ranging dilemmas 
25 
26 that inevitably confront sport. 
27 
28 
Sport’s most vexing problems, including where to draw lines related to the use of 
30 
31 performance enhancement practices (e.g. limiting technologies including therapeutic drug 
32 
33 usage), how to define acceptable limits of physicality in collision sports (e.g. tackles targeting 
34 
35 
the head in gridiron football), and when to exclude certain athletes from competitions due to 
37 
38 ‘unfair’ natural advantages (e.g. Caster Semenya’s exclusion from IAAF 800m events based on 
39 
40 abnormally high levels of testosterone), generally result in fluctuating, contested, and uncertain 
41 
42 
rulings. Complexities and controversies in these instances arise because the issue is not merely 
43 
44 
45 one of how to best realize the point and purpose of a particular sporting practice, but also these 
46 
47 dilemmas also relate to, for instance, wider and more complicated questions of economic and 
48 
49 political disparity (e.g. access to technology), health and well-being (e.g. long-term effects of 
50 
51 
brain injuries), and human rights (e.g. gender classification and hyperandrogenism), and 
53 
54 subsequently bring non-sport considerations (and stakeholders) into the rational fray. 


















3 In such complicated and far-reaching instances, Morgan contends that disparate 
4 
5 
normative communities ‘default’ to supposedly inferior yet functionally ‘pragmatic’ and/or 
7 
8 ‘imaginative’ resolutions to their conflicts. In other words, the best a varied mix of stakeholders 
9 
10 can do when confronted by a vexing, multipronged impasse is to arrive at some merely 
11 
12 
functional, rationally indeterminate, and ultimately unsatisfactory conclusion. Our alternative 
14 
15 pragmatic conventionalist account offers rich and meaningful normative resources to pick up 
16 
17 where Morgan’s conventionalism ends, where narrow inquiry into sport transitions to 
18 
19 
multifaceted inquiry in and through sport.  Far from being arational, our conventionalist offering 
20 
21 
22 provides substantive means to move more complicated and intractable sporting dilemmas beyond 
23 
24 intellectual stalemates that arise with appeals by disparate normative vocabularies. 
25 
26 We develop our paper in three sections.  The first provides an historical overview of 
27 
28 
conventional thinking in relation to sport normativity.  The second focuses on understanding 
30 
31 ‘third wave’ pragmatist philosophy as ‘transitionalism’ (Koopman 2009) – a contemporary 
32 
33 account of practical rationality that we suggest provides a useful philosophical tool for the 
34 
35 
critical assessment of sporting conventions.  The third section shows how transitionalism re- 
37 
38 orientates and transforms our normative efforts in the face of intractable sporting problems with 
39 
40 respect to the three cornerstones of Morgan’s deep conventionalism: the nature and status of 
41 
42 
different sporting conventions; the difference between conflicts of an ‘intramural’ and 
43 
44 
45 ‘extramural’ kind; and what constitutes a resolution to sporting disagreements.  In the 
46 
47 conclusion, we briefly sketch out how pragmatism challenges customary criticisms of laissez 
48 
49 faire conventional accounts of sport: that they are more about describing than appraising norms, 
50 
51 
conflate morality with membership, and accept ethical claims as arbitrary and relative (as 
53 
54 summarized by Ciomaga 2012). 





















Conventional Theories of Sport 
7 
8 D’Agostino’s (1981) introduction of conventionalism into the sport philosophy literature 
9 
10 offers an alternative to the alleged rigidity and idealistic conception of sport presented by 
11 
12 
formalists such as Suits (1978).  On his account, D’Agostino argues we can distinguish sporting 
14 
15 games not only in terms of permissible and impermissible acts, but also in terms of what 
16 
17 qualifies as impermissible yet acceptable behavior exemplified by strategic fouling in basketball; 
18 
19 
or permissible yet unacceptable behavior such as pressing for an advantage when an opponent is 
20 
21 
22 seriously injured in association football (e.g. Hardman 2009).  In attempting to differentiate 
23 
24 between the normative and descriptive realities of sporting conduct, D’Agostino’s brusque 
25 





31 The main criticism, particularly from those who advocate an interpretivist (or broad 
32 
33 internalist) perspective (e.g. Simon, 2000; Dixon, 2003; Russell 2018), is that conventional 
34 
35 
approaches to sport such as those advanced by D’Agostino allow ‘wide-acceptance’ from within 
37 
38 a practice community as sufficient normative justification for commonplace sporting behavior. 
39 
40 Dixon’s (2003) summary, for instance, negatively links conventional premises with Burke’s 
41 
42 
(1997) Rortyan inspired1  claim that ‘there is no deeper foundation to rationality than solidarity’ 
43 
44 
45 (p.61).  So if a sporting community, such as professional men’s ice hockey in North America, 
46 
47 widely accepts the use of fisticuffs to punish convention violators, then fighting in ice hockey is 
48 
49 justified simply because the membership (or more likely the most powerful members) ‘say so’. 
50 
51 
Ultimately critics like Dixon claim that conventional theories, particularly the laissez-faire 
53 
54 populist kind attributable to D’Agostino, lack normative power for three related reasons: they are 






















8 Morgan’s (2012) re-introduction of conventionalism, largely in response to the 
9 
10 prevalence of ahistorical interpretivist accounts in the sport philosophy literature, presses his 
11 
12 
view that the socio-historical contingencies that create sporting practices function to 
14 
15 conditionally (rather than inherently) furnish normative credentials in the form of ‘deep 
16 
17 conventions’.  Certain conventions, at particular times, for specific communities, qualify as 
18 
19 
‘deep’ if they are ‘historically embedded “first” principles’ (Morgan, 2012, p.74).  From such 
20 
21 
22 deep resources, members of a practice community construct a particularized and privileged 
23 
24 normative vocabulary that defines a logic internal to that practice – a logic that is akin to the way 
25 
26 that interpretivists reason about principles that describe the point and purpose of social practices. 
27 
28 
When confronted by a sporting dilemma, Morgan contends, practitioners must refer to these 
30 
31 historically tethered deep conventions if they want to arrive at rational, internally justifiable 
32 
33 normative solutions (p.74).  Morgan, in effect, asks us to think about what is at the normative 
34 
35 




40 Morgan’s (2012) conventionalist account, citing the work of Lewis (2002), relies on 
41 
42 
establishing distinctions between deep conventions and ‘coordinating conventions’, as well as 
43 
44 
45 other social norms such as ‘customs’.  For Morgan, deep conventions are crucial for normative 
46 
47 (moral) discourse, whereas coordinating conventions are merely responsible for the prudential 
48 
49 (non-moral) regulation of sporting practices (e.g. baseball players running the bases in a counter- 
50 
51 
rather than clockwise direction). Customs (e.g. athletes wearing white attire at Wimbledon, 




















3 Christians going to church on Sundays) merely denote simple regularities or aesthetic (non- 
4 
5 
moral) preferences in behavior and action (p.78).2 
7 
8 While all three types of norms are socially and historically grounded, Morgan (2012) 
9 
10 acknowledges that coordinating conventions and customs are justified targets for interpretivist 
11 
12 
criticism because their normative characteristics are ‘shallow’ (or non-moral) as ‘the hold they 
14 
15 have on us is not owed to their intellectual force but rather their mere agreeability’ (p.72). 
16 
17 Morally imbued deep conventions, alternatively, are ‘rationally friendly social agreements’ and 
18 
19 
logically necessary to fuel a ‘rationally defensible normative theory of sport’ (p.77). 
20 
21 
22 Morgan’s conventionalist account impacts on the normative landscape of social practices 
23 
24 by determining what constitutes rational discussion, who can participate in this discourse, and 
25 
26 what kinds of resolutions can be reached.  As Morgan (2012) contends, ‘deep’ rational discourse 
27 
28 
about socio-historical agreements is restricted to points of view that reference core features (deep 
30 
31 conventions) internal to a practice. This also entails that only interlocutors who share a practice- 
32 
33 defined understanding of the internal logic of sport will be able to access the deep normative 
34 
35 
qualities central to certain sporting conventions because only those engaged in ‘intramural’ 
37 
38 argumentation can say ‘something intellectually compelling’ that contributes to the ‘rational 
39 
40 fray’ (p.74). As a result, ‘rational argument is a viable enterprise if, and only if, there is 
41 
42 
agreement on the relevant social norms governing reason-giving, that is, if and only if such 
43 
44 
45 reason-giving is moved to the ‘interior’ of a normative vocabulary’ (p.74). 
46 
47 In the absence of rational resolutions, Morgan concludes, disparate normative 
48 
49 communities can default at best to inferior yet functionally ‘pragmatic’ and/or ‘imaginative’ 
50 
51 
resolutions to their conflicts.  Pragmatic resolutions are, therefore, often mobilized in order to 
 
move beyond intellectual stalemates that arise out of appeals by disparate normative vocabularies 

















3 where the aim is to merely ‘get results’.  Yet these pragmatic resolutions are, from Morgan’s 
4 
5 




10 Third Wave Pragmatism (Transitionalism) 
11 
12 
Our contribution to the re-emergence of conventionalism is to pick up where Morgan 
14 
15 believes reason ‘taps out’ by presenting a version of pragmatism capable of doing ‘heavy 
16 
17 normative lifting’, particularly when social practices like sport are confronted by seemingly 
18 
19 
intractable dilemmas that require references beyond the point and purpose of sport. In particular, 
20 
21 
22 we contend Koopman’s third-wave pragmatism or ‘transitionalism’ offers a kind of rationality 
23 
24 well suited to address sport’s most vexing problems – the kind that resist agreements on the 
25 
26 normative materiality of certain conventions, who can participate in rational discourse, and what 
27 
28 
solutions might be considered ‘justifiable’. 
30 
31 As a philosophical movement those considered pragmatists go beyond simplistic ‘get 
32 
33 results’ or ‘whatever it takes’ notions to robustly engage in normative inquiry.  While sharp and 
34 
35 
seemingly incommensurable divisions exist amongst pragmatic philosophers, what binds them 
37 
38 most is an anti-foundationalist approach to issues that arise from our daily lives, and a view that 
39 
40 resources temporally available to us through ongoing social interaction offer possible 
41 
42 
instruments to develop incrementally better, or ‘melioristic’, resolutions rather than final 
43 
44 
45 solutions to our contemporary problems.  Pragmatists typically avoid ideologies, rigid systems, 
46 
47 fixed truths, and distrust absolutes when engaging in philosophical inquiry (e.g. Bacon 2012; 
48 
49 Putnam 1995; Bernstein 1991).3 Subsequently, pragmatism shares many affinities with Morgan’s 
50 
51 
historically charged account of conventionalism. 




















3 Traditional divisions of pragmatism tend to focus on those adhering to its ‘first wave’ 
4 
5 
classical roots with an emphasis on experience and the empirical method (e.g. Peirce, James, 
7 
8 Dewey), and those more contemporary ‘second wave’ instantiations focusing on the uses of 
9 
10 language (e.g. Rorty, Putnam, Brandom).  Koopman (2009) contends that ‘third wave’ 
11 
12 
pragmatism at its best follows the lead of Emerson, James, Dewey, and Rorty by conceptualizing 
14 
15 the philosophical project as ‘melioristic cultural criticism’ (p.5).  Viewed in this light, 
16 
17 pragmatism attempts to ‘[contribute] thought to our most critical moments’; it considers 
18 
19 
philosophy ‘as a means of orienting and adjusting our practices of critique and inquiry’ rather 
20 
21 
22 than as a system offering ‘explanations about everything’ (p.5).  At the heart of melioristic 
23 
24 cultural criticism, according to Koopman, is an emphasis on ‘transitionality’ understood as 
25 
26 ‘temporally mediated development’. Contrasted with ‘temporally mediated difference’ (random 
27 
28 
or coincidental change), transitionalism enacts purposive, directed, hopeful development (p. 13). 
30 
31 The point of third wave pragmatism, therefore, is to intelligently guide our social 
32 
33 practices, to settle problems as they arise and foster conditions to meliorate (purposively attempt 
34 
35 
to make better) the complex web of social practices that shape our meaningful transactions with 
37 
38 the (sport) world.  Transitionality implies that our social practices tend to embody the kind of 
39 
40 normative durability over time reflected in Morgan’s deep conventionalist account. At the same 
41 
42 
time, nevertheless, transitionality implies a constant dynamism and with it an appreciation for 
43 
44 
45 inevitable and ongoing normative transformation – a point also made by Morgan in his review of 
46 
47 the changes to sports’ normative self-understandings throughout history. Normative features of 
48 
49 social practices, from a pragmatic perspective, are therefore best understood as transitional. As 
50 
51 
Koopman (2009) writes, ‘instead of talking about certain practices as true or good, we should 
 
instead talk about them as truer and better’.  ‘Instead of focusing on epistemic or moral 

















3 rightness’, Koopman continues, ‘we should instead focus on epistemic or moral melioration, 
4 
5 
improvement, development, and growth’ (pp.11-12). 
7 
8 Rationality, from this pragmatic perspective, avoids pre-existing methods or logical 
9 
10 formulations.  Systematic, rigid, and predetermined forms of reasoning, pragmatists argue, fail to 
11 
12 
leave room for new forms of inquiry, for practices to make best use of the resources available to 
14 
15 them at certain times and in certain places. To engage in inquiry from a pragmatic perspective 
16 
17 therefore requires the use of any number of ‘instruments’ that cannot be fully determined as 
18 
19 
‘useful’ prior to the emergence of the problem-at-hand (Elcombe 2018).  The socio-historically 
20 
21 
22 infused problems of a practice community must be addressed as they contextually arise, dealt 
23 
24 with in the moment by using all available resources. ‘In these conditions’, Koopman contends, 
25 
26 ‘pragmatists will freely avail themselves of resources offered up by their non-pragmatist 
27 
28 
colleagues, including not only philosophers inquiring in the context of other problems but also 
30 
31 historians, anthropologists, policy analysts, and engineers’ (p.5). As such, pragmatism is well- 
32 
33 suited to provide the rational resources needed to address the complex intellectual stalemates 
34 
35 




40 Pragmatic Conventionalism in Sport 
41 
42 
Our pragmatic perspective broadly supports Morgan’s historically and socially attuned 
43 
44 
45 normative account of sport.  In particular, we concur with Morgan that deep conventions 
46 
47 articulate the power of certain durable, historically derived social norms to maintain the ‘smooth 
48 
49 maintenance’ of sporting practices by setting the backdrop for its temporal, ethical, aesthetic, and 
50 
51 
prudential self-understanding.  Our account of conventionalism then picks up where Morgan’s 
53 
54 rational account ends: when deep conventions definitive of the current point and purpose of a 
















3 social practice fail to resource a clear response to a normative dilemma; when extramural discord 
4 
5 
erupts between communities of practitioners who enter into discourse appropriating alternative 
7 
8 normative languages and merely ‘talk past’ each other; and when the inevitable ‘intellectual 
9 
10 impasse’ results in the loss of ‘intellectual footing’ that offers no justifiable solutions to 
11 
12 
normative quandaries (Morgan 2012, p.75). 
14 
15 We argue for the addition of a ‘pragmatic turn’ (Bernstein 2010) to Morgan’s deep 
16 
17 conventionalism.  There are three aspects to this pragmatist approach.  First, we contend any 
18 
19 
convention is potentially meaningful or relevant (our conception of deep) when existing social 
20 
21 
22 norms fail to illuminate clear solutions to sporting problems.  Second, we argue for dissolving 
23 
24 distinctions between intramural and extramural perspectives to encourage ‘problematization’ and 
25 
26 a more open dialogue that goes beyond factional dissent between rival conventions.  Third, we 
27 
28 
claim that normative inquiry informed by pragmatism and conceived as meliorative conventional 
30 
31 criticism can provide a range of constructive resolutions to sporting practices’ most vexing 
32 





38 Pragmatic Turn #1: Re-Considering Deep Conventions 
39 
40 Our first pragmatic turn proposes that in the face of an intractable problem, such as the 
41 
42 
inclusion or exclusion of hyperandrogenous female athletes in certain IAAF track and field 
43 
44 
45 events, the very nature of what counts as ‘deep’ itself becomes a matter of contention. Morgan 
46 
47 acknowledges that rational discourse based on the mobilization of a definitive set of certain 
48 
49 (deep) conventions at times fails to provide a clear resolution to a normative dilemma. In these 
50 
51 
instances, we argue, there is merit in considering the critical potential of any or all conventions 
53 
54 that can make a useful contribution to address the issue at hand. This more pluralistic view is tied 

















3 to the importance and significance of what distresses or matters to practitioners rather than 
4 
5 
judgments about the distinctive rational qualities used to demarcate sporting disagreements. 
7 
8 Morgan himself hints at possible complications in his normative framework where he 
9 
10 notes that though surface conventions in the shape of customs are normatively deficient (i.e. they 
11 
12 
don’t really address a sport’s point and purpose), in practice, and for good reason, they may 
14 
15 obfuscate what is presumed, as Morgan would have it, ‘deep’ about sport.  With regard to the 
16 
17 norm of athletes wearing white attire when competing at Wimbledon, for example, he notes that 
18 
19 
‘violating the surface convention meant one was also violating the deep convention about how 
20 
21 
22 tennis and cricket ought to be played’. Nevertheless, he continues, ‘the fact that sometimes 
23 
24 violating a surface convention corresponds as well to violating its deep convention . . . doesn’t 
25 
26 change the fact that the former is parasitic on the latter rather than the other way around’ (p.78). 
27 
28 
What holds sway to demarcate what is ‘deep’ for Morgan here, both to tease apart and to 
30 
31 rank order reasoning, seems to be an understanding of the ‘proper ends of sport’ – or more 
32 
33 specifically a perfectionist ideal related to the pursuit of athletic excellence (e.g. Dixon 1999). 
34 
35 
Violations of custom (or coordination), such as the expectation athletes will wear whites at 
37 
38 Wimbledon, must, regardless of how much they may outrage tennis devotees, give way to a 
39 
40 rational core upon which such a custom is considered parasitic.  From Morgan’s deep 
41 
42 
conventionalist account, the colour of tennis clothing is normatively irrelevant because it stands 
43 
44 
45 removed from the point and purpose of the practice. 
46 
47 Our suggestions here are pragmatic ones related to a restricted view of what it means to 
48 
49 conduct rational inquiry when complex dilemmas arise.  By their nature such intractable 
50 
51 
problems indicate that, in vital and irresolvable ways, at present there is either insufficient 
53 
54 agreement on what the proper ends of sport should be; or even if there is unanimity about such 

















3 matters, there is an impasse with regards to which course of reasoning and action best achieves 
4 
5 
the agreed ends.  In such vexing instances, discourse oriented exclusively around the proper ends 
7 
8 or point and purpose of sporting practices, whether historically defined or not, may provide 
9 
10 limited benefit and potentially discount discussions about what, in a pragmatic sense, now 
11 
12 
matters most to a community’s normative self-understanding.  In the case of Caster Semenya, for 
14 
15 example, communal values related to fair competition and athletic excellence are joined by non- 
16 
17 sporting ideas related to gender equality and human rights to complicate and intensify the issue. 
18 
19 
Our pragmatist approach to such deadlock is that we widen our conventional backdrop 
20 
21 
22 and rather than attempt to locate a ‘truer’ version of the point and purpose of a game, we try to 
23 
24 alight upon the practice community’s own most accurate depiction of its socio-historically 
25 
26 evolved (and deeply meaningful) values, beliefs, and ideas.  So from this perspective a number 
27 
28 
of difficult debates (i.e. the inclusion of rules that prioritize attack over defense; the inclination 
30 
31 for officiating decisions to advantage the offensive team; the protection of athletes from the 
32 
33 repercussions of head injuries; an emphasis on a certain aesthetic look to the participants; and 
34 
35 
adjustments to sporting practices to heighten spectator experiences) should not be understood 
37 
38 solely on the basis of whether they realize the proper ends or point and purpose of sporting 
39 
40 practices. Instead, such disputes are to be seen as wholly social and historical reflections of what 
41 
42 
matters now; a view that means it is difficult to see a ‘fix’ solely in terms of what is deep about 
43 
44 
45 sporting conventions (and thus normatively primary) from what is surface or custom.  In a 
46 
47 pragmatic sense then, what is deep, what is superficial, or what is customary must be also 
48 
49 considered alongside what matters to practitioners as there is no guarantee that such a rational 
50 
51 
blueprint will ensure normative disputes bottom-out at one and the same place. 
53 
54 

















3 Where it is possible to see regularities in action in the case of wearing whites at 
4 
5 
Wimbledon as normatively irrelevant and an example of a ‘surface convention’, for social 
7 
8 practice members in a certain time and place such matters had significant contextual 
9 
10 meaningfulness and subsequently noncompliers were subject to significant normative ire. Such 
11 
12 
‘customs’ or ‘surface conventions’ may matter to sport communities in defining what it means to 
14 
15 be, as Rorty (2007) argues, ‘one of us’, and thus potentially worthy of normative attention. 
16 
17 Drawing historically attuned distinctions between shallow and deep conventions is 
18 
19 
normatively useful. But when appeals to ‘internal logic’ fail to solve a sporting community 
20 
21 
22 dilemma, it becomes critical to appreciate the thick temporally contextual characteristics of 
23 
24 ‘conventions’. As Morgan (2012) demonstrates when referring to the transhistorical relevance of 
25 
26 ancient Greek, 19th century British, and 20th century American sport, what matters most to a 
27 
28 
social practice at a particular juncture is often dynamically unrestrained by historical precedent 
30 
31 or internal logic.  A pragmatic extension of conventionalism therefore contends that any socio- 
32 
33 historically constructed conventions may normatively matter to some degree at some point. As 
34 
35 
such, all conventions may contribute substantive measures constitutive of the social practice’s 
37 
38 moral self-understanding, and what is considered normatively ‘deep’ today may matter less in a 
39 
40 different socio-historical context (e.g. excluding professionals in the Olympics).  Likewise, what 
41 
42 
is now viewed as merely a custom or a shallow convention may emerge as materially important 
43 
44 
45 in the future (e.g. medically informed changes to rugby scrum rules). When confronted by a 
46 
47 vexing sporting dilemma, such as the eligibility of naturally advantaged (e.g. hyperandrogenous) 
48 
49 athletes, it is crucial from a pragmatic perspective to leave normative space for conventions that 
50 
51 
matter more to emerge and those that matter less to recede. 
53 
54 

















3 Pragmatic Turn #2. Pluralistic Problematization of Material Conventions 
4 
5 
Most normative accounts in the philosophy of sport share an assumption that social 
7 
8 practices are comprised of ‘members’ committed to upholding the values, beliefs, and ideals that 
9 
10 frame its normative landscape. For a deep conventionalist like Morgan, it can be assumed that 
11 
12 
participants gain ‘membership status’ by accepting the normative gravitas of the cluster of 
14 
15 inherited conventions at work within the social practice at certain times and in certain places. 
16 
17 And while Morgan (2012) is keen to stress that anyone ‘can enter into and contribute to the 
18 
19 
rational fray’, interlocutor legitimacy is, for him, ‘confined to a particular community of inquiry’ 
20 
21 
22 (pp.74-75) identifiable in terms of those who share common grounds for rational discourse. 
23 
24 Morgan argues that those deep within a practice ‘talk past’ those considered beyond its 
25 
26 logical bounds, where the kind of language by which a practice community describes itself to 
27 
28 
people on the outside is said to be utterly incomprehensible (p.75).  Clear normative ground rules 
30 
31 are established whereby only those capable of speaking the ‘deep’ internal language of a social 
32 
33 practice can engage in ‘rational’ discourse. ‘Rational adjudication of normative conflicts 
34 
35 
regarding the purpose of sport is’, Morgan (2012) concludes, ‘possible on my account only if 
37 
38 those conflicts are of the intramural rather than extramural variety. Once those conflicts extend 
39 
40 beyond the logical space of reasons authorized by the deep conventions of a particular 
41 
42 
community of inquiry all rational bets are off’ (p.76). 
43 
44 
45 As Morgan himself recognizes, however, practices and their conventions are always 
46 
47 already influenced by socio-historical factors from ‘within’ and ‘beyond’. The constitution of 
48 
49 social practices such as sport involve participants who are involved in a plurality of practice 
50 
51 
communities and therefore intractable problems emerge from within an environment itself 
53 
54 subject to ongoing multi- rather than uni-vocal debates. The normative challenge often becomes 

















3 how to square overlapping practices and their most material conventions in ways that ‘fit’ with a 
4 
5 
diverse range of beliefs and values. At times, considerations of what ‘we’ do go beyond the 
7 
8 particularity of the point and purpose of a sporting practice – sometimes what ‘we’ do in sport 
9 
10 conflicts with what ‘we’ do in other contexts. 
11 
12 
Normative frameworks from different social practices inevitably ‘bump into’ one another 
14 
15 – sometimes quietly, at times in sensational ways that draw attention to a normative 
16 
17 disequilibrium that exists between them. It took, for instance, cries for change by the media, 
18 
19 
medical professionals, and the public-at-large following a rash of suicides by former North 
20 
21 
22 American athletes later diagnosed with Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE – a progressive 
23 
24 degeneration of the brain potentially caused by repeated head injuries) for gridiron football and 
25 
26 ice hockey policy makers to give any thought to reconsidering the normative legitimacy of rules 
27 
28 
reflecting certain deeply defended conventions at work in their collision sports. 
30 
31 For this reason, when intramural discourse reaches its rational limits, those considered 
32 
33 ‘outside’ a practice’s inner sanctum, yet vested in some way with the normative influence of 
34 
35 
certain conventions adopted by these communities, can bring to bear important conventional 
37 
38 insights. Therefore vested, yet ‘less deep’, participants (e.g. medical practitioners) can play a 
39 
40 crucial discursive role alongside those centrally engaged in a practice community who speak the 
41 
42 
internalist language. When confronted by complex dilemmas, dissolving the internal/external 
43 
44 
45 divide fully democratizes the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of normative discourse. 
46 
47 While misunderstandings and ‘language barriers’ between those Morgan’s insiders and 
48 
49 outsiders are certainly possible and a potential complication, what matters most when an 
50 
51 
intractable problem arises, we argue, is how practice communities initiate and respond to 
53 
54 criticisms levelled at them, and the lengths they go to allow for the potential normative 

















3 significance central to that dispute to emerge. Medical professionals certainly speak a different 
4 
5 
normative language than sport insiders and assess sporting practices through alternative 
7 
8 normative lenses; however, they still can make important contributions to sport’s normative self- 
9 
10 understanding. It is a view that suggests we ought to allow significant latitude in the normative 
11 
12 
process rather than seek to reject ‘outsider’ viewpoints because, in their supposed ‘pre-’ or ‘a- 
14 
15 rational’ state, they do not effectively and efficiently pass intellectual muster. So though 
16 
17 privileging internal expert members and their established language games can, at times, avoid the 
18 
19 
emergence of complicated impasses, such privileging is potentially indicative of a practice’s long 
20 
21 
22 history of resisting change, avoiding normative self-examination, and limiting opportunities for 
23 
24 meaningful critical engagement involving a range of perspectives. 
25 
26 Subsequently, it is crucial that social practices not avoid the emergence of problems, even 
27 
28 
complex problems, but instead engage in ongoing critical appraisals of a social practice’s 
30 
31 material conventions.  Koopman’s (2009) third-wave pragmatic perspective refers to this 
32 
33 necessary feature of transitionalism as ‘problematization’.  The purpose of problematization is 
34 
35 
not to ‘subversively denounce’ a social practice’s material conventions as a Nietzschean might 
37 
38 suggest, but to instead ‘throw light’ on potential problems ‘deep at the heart of who we are’ as 
39 
40 they emerge in ever changing socio-historical contexts (p.539).  Koopman takes his 
41 
42 
‘problematization’ cue from Foucault (1997), who writes, ‘My point is not that everything is bad, 
43 
44 
45 but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is 
46 
47 dangerous, then we always have something to do’ (p.256). Vibrant practice communities from a 
48 
49 pragmatic transitionalist perspective not only remain open to criticism from all corners but seek 
50 
51 
out and/or intentionally intensify problems to set the process of normative inquiry in motion. 
53 
54 

















3 We best initiate normative inquiry through the process of problematization and by 
4 
5 
viewing conventions with many different lenses; problematization is therefore ‘multi-linguistic’ 
7 
8 because we live our lives participating in (and/or responsible to) multiple, rather than unitary 
9 
10 practices appealing to a range of conventions in varying contexts. Crucially then, from a 
11 
12 
pragmatic perspective, any stakeholder with a vested interest in the workings of a social practice 
14 
15 – including (but not limited to) experts, the media, educators, parents, and the medical 
16 
17 community – may initiate critical normative inquiry. This pluralistic and active approach to 
18 
19 
problematization is in keeping with the social and historical realities of practice communities; it 
20 
21 
22 is an account that demands in equal measure an on-going conforming to, and challenging of, 
23 
24 conventional norms. Viewing the normative role of conventions from our emergent pragmatic 
25 
26 perspective therefore opens and widens space to initiate melioristic cultural criticism by 
27 
28 




33 Pragmatic Turn #3. Pragmatic Responses to Problematized Material Conventions 
34 
35 
The final step, from our pragmatic conventionalist perspective, considers the span of 
37 
38 possible responses to the problematization of material conventions.  The complexity and 
39 
40 ‘messiness’ of vexing sporting problems, such as performance enhancement regulations and 
41 
42 
accepted levels of physicality in collision sports, result in a resistance to polished, widely 
43 
44 
45 accepted, and terminal normative conclusions. 
46 
47 From a pragmatic conventionalist perspective, problems of the intractable kind are better 
48 
49 understood as historical, temporal and continuous rather than disconnected, temporary, and 
50 
51 
finite; and because of this shift in perspective in the way normative inquiry is seen, it also shifts 
53 
54 procedural expectations in terms of a remedy.  Instead of pursuing bottomed-out solutions based 

















3 on the division between rational and arational, responses based on marginal gains, improvement, 
4 
5 
development, progress, growth and melioration suggest a way to process these obdurate, yet 
7 
8 deeply meaningful problems. So where Morgan suggests that pragmatically derived conventions 
9 
10 are inevitably fated to be of a shallow coordinating kind, we argue that the pragmatic process 
11 
12 
enacted in the face of an intractable dilemma provides the necessary conduit to a full range of 
14 
15 possible responses and engenders hope within a sport practice community (and beyond) for 
16 
17 meaningful problem melioration. 
18 
19 
Thus, when the hard work of meliorative inquiry is initiated, one of three pragmatic 
20 
21 
22 responses will come about. The first possible response to an intractable problem will be a (a) 
23 
24 deferred response.  In this instance, melioristic inquiry results in no immediate and definitive 
25 
26 action taken.  Though responses are deferred, ‘no action’ is not akin to ‘inaction’ provided 
27 
28 
transparent meliorative inquiry and critical assessment takes place. 
30 
31 Deferred responses can be explained in a number of ways.  It may be that those with 
32 
33 important critical meliorative contributions view the timing to activate any kind of response 
34 
35 
challenging.  Inquiry may suggest practice participants require preparation time to craft, trial, and 
37 
38 embed changes to the operating convention – assuming changes are eventually deemed 
39 
40 warranted at all. Consideration may be given to experiments with a range of alternatives or to 
41 
42 
engage further in dialogue with still more vested parties and experts. For example, despite 
43 
44 
45 increasing public demands in 2010 for ice hockey’s premier professional institution, the National 
46 
47 Hockey League (NHL), to implement mid-season conventional changes to ban body checks 
48 
49 targeting the head of an opponent, officials instead used offseason experimental sessions to craft 
50 
51 
a new rule and also collected empirical data from related rule changes recently imposed by the 
53 
54 Canadian Major Junior hockey leagues. Institutions like the NHL regularly choose to defer 



















3 responses to a later point in time because the available alternatives now, after careful 
4 
5 
consideration, appear more problematic than the current (and deeply historical and embedded) 
7 
8 conventional practice. 
9 
10 Secondly, practices may adopt (b) working resolutions. Such challenging, tentative, 
11 
12 
experimental conclusions arising from meliorative inquiry never elicit universal assent, and the 
14 
15 complexity and messiness of a vexing sporting problem demands implemented resolutions 
16 
17 remain open for revision.  However, as the process of problematization from any number of 
18 
19 
stakeholders may introduce an overriding sensibility that something must be done to address the 
20 
21 
22 obstinate issue, and that any adopted resolutions must be petitioned to do real work, such 
23 
24 ‘tweaks’ are considered to make a difference functionally and create space for more meaningful 
25 
26 practice participation as well as contribute positively to overlapping social practices. 
27 
28 
When meliorative inquiry deems immediate action necessary, concerned inquirers can 
30 
31 collectively contribute to the drafting of resolutions that are subject to constant testing and 
32 
33 retesting from any number of vantage points.  The working resolutions, therefore, remain open to 
34 
35 
(and ideally encourage) the recurring process of problematization and continuing meliorative 
37 
38 inquiry.  When evidence is available to suggest that a working resolution reduces the problem, 
39 
40 and as a consequence, downgrades the intensity and truncates inquiry, something more 
41 
42 
definitively can be said about the value and justification of the resolution. Up to that point 
43 
44 
45 judgment awaits as the problem persists, which is itself an ongoing invitation for amended or 
46 
47 new resolutions. The NHL, for instance, rewrote Rule 48.1 related to ‘illegal hits to the head’ on 
48 
49 several occasions after deciding in 2010 something did, upon reflection and in response to wider 
50 
51 
social pressures, need changing regarding player safety. 

















3 Similarly, the Court of Arbitration for Sport delivery of an award on 30 April 2019 with 
4 
5 
respect to the challenges brought by Caster Semenya and Athletics South Africa to the validity of 
7 
8 the IAAF’s Eligibility Regulations for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (‘DSD’ 
9 
10 Regulations) can be viewed as a working resolution.4   The panel came to a majority rather than a 
11 
12 
unanimous decision and found that the DSD Regulations are discriminatory and expressed 
14 
15 serious concerns about their future practical application.  So though on the basis of the evidence 
16 
17 submitted by the parties, the panel considered the discrimination associated with DSD regulation 
18 
19 
a necessary, reasonable and proportionate means of achieving the legitimate objective of 
20 
21 
22 ensuring fair competition in female athletics in certain events and protecting the ‘protected class’ 
23 
24 of female athletes in those events, they concluded that the prima facie proportionality may 
25 





31 Third, the most radical pragmatic response to obdurate problems results in (c) new or 
32 
33 alternative conventions that emerge out of existing practice norms.  Sometimes new 
34 
35 
conventions arise from conflict within prevailing arrangements; disagreement serves as a 
37 
38 meaningful, convention-grounded source for alternative ways of doing things. Deeply cherished 
39 
40 conventions related to athlete vulnerability in gridiron football, rugby, and ice hockey, for 
41 
42 
instance, historically placed the burden of responsibility on the athletes receiving the hit to 
43 
44 
45 protect themselves. Following the highly public condemnation of collision sport practices, the 
46 
47 National Football League (NFL), International Rugby Board (IRB), and NHL (eventually) 
48 
49 changed several rules to reflect an alternative conventional norm whereby athletes delivering the 
50 
51 
hit took on most of the responsibility to ensure their opponent was not vulnerable.  These new 
53 
54 rules defining acceptable ways of initiating collisions significantly altered the tactics and 



















3 techniques for rugby, ice hockey, and tackle football, reducing the inherent degree of violence in 
4 
5 
the games and subsequently making defensive play more challenging. 
7 
8 The possibility of new or alternative conventions may ultimately lead to the provision of 
9 
10 a range of similar but crucially distinct practices. As Koopman (2011) writes, ‘Problematizations 
11 
12 
are formed at the intersection of a congeries of practices and in such a way that stabilized 
14 
15 problematizations themselves become platforms for the elaboration of newer practices. 
16 
17 Problematizations are made possible by the assembly of practices and in turn these 
18 
19 
problematizations make further practices possible’ (pp.5-6). For example, in response to the 
20 
21 
22 problematization of gridiron football conventions that codify collisions, flag football has 
23 
24 emerged as a new sporting practice with American youth (ages 6-12) participation rates 
25 
26 surpassing tackle football (Drape & Belson 2018). Flag football, regularly disparaged by those 
27 
28 
‘deep’ within the gridiron football practice, offers an alternative form of the game based on rules 
30 
31 that reinforce alternative conventions – namely the necessity of collisions. The game’s modified 
32 
33 rules make it safer and more inclusive (and cheaper), and subsequently is trumpeted as one of the 
34 
35 
fastest growing sports in North America and beyond (Football Canada n.d). 
37 
38 In such cases, pragmatic inquiry nurtures a plurality of conventions emblematic of a 
39 
40 healthy and vibrant practice.  While it is true that versions of a social practice can rightly be 
41 
42 
identified and understood as similar and familiar, at the same time within the various 
43 
44 
45 formulations critical conventions do significant work to mark-out each as a unique sphere of 
46 
47 action.  The difficulty here, evidently, involves how best to respond to the various alternative and 
48 
49 new conventions that arise through this process.  There can also be no presumption that only one 
50 
51 
(established) convention ought to hold sway or that all engaged in the practice must go along 

















3 with any convention.  This unitary nexus, therefore, can no longer be the predominant 
4 
5 
perspective through which complex issues in sport are understood. 
7 
8 The important point here is that the more likely obstacle to meliorative normative inquiry 
9 
10 in sport is not arationality resulting from the emergence of a plethora of novel or reconstructed 
11 
12 
conventions, but a paucity of alternatives and the cessation of imaginative thinking.  In this light, 
14 
15 encouraging a plurality of responses to be seriously entertained becomes crucial for providing a 
16 






22 The existence of divergent conventions grounded on a range of different ideas engage 
23 
24 practice community participants (and beyond) in meaningful meliorative inquiry.  With the 
25 
26 possibility of a plurality of conventions, alternatives are always available for critical assessment 
27 
28 
and reconstructive consideration.  Over time, different conventions challenge one another when 
30 
31 problematized and, as a result, the existing convention may be reaffirmed, or else point to the 
32 
33 emergence of a different version as outdated conventions fade away.  It is the critical process 
34 
35 
initiated, more so than the resolutions proffered when normative issues arise, that creates space 
37 





Conclusion: Addressing the Three Critiques of Conventionalism 
43 
44 
45 In sum, a pragmatically-oriented, meliorative approach to problems and solutions offers 
46 
47 further normative resources to those Morgan suggests in his first presentation of deep 
48 
49 conventionalism. Agreement predicated in terms of Morgan’s understanding of rationality 
50 
51 
provides an historically-attuned way to justify solutions to intramural problems; but when they 
53 
54 become increasingly complicated, something more than an inferior or shallow resolution is 

















3 available. When confronted by complex, intractable problems, hard distinctions between moral 
4 
5 
(deep) and non-moral (shallow) conventions, internal and external languages and participants, 
7 
8 and rational and non-rational responses, must be dissolved. A pragmatic conventionalist 
9 
10 approach thus fully invests in the normative process – an ongoing process encouraging multi- 
11 
12 
layered and integrated inquiry that aims for deeply meaningful melioristic responses when clear 
14 
15 intramural solutions cannot be found. 
16 
17 Although our intention is not to engage in intricate metaphilosophical analysis, we do 
18 
19 
take the renewed discourse on the normative credentials of sporting conventions as indicative 
20 
21 
22 that the first of three common criticisms regularly lobbed against D’Agostino’s laissez faire 
23 
24 populist version of conventionalism – that such accounts offer little of relevance for critical 
25 
26 normative inquiry – is evidently contestable. Morgan compellingly demonstrates that certain 
27 
28 
conventions in certain contexts play crucial normative roles within social practices, including 
30 
31 sporting communities.  Our first pragmatic ‘turn’ reaffirms, and we feel extends, the normative 
32 





38 Normative frameworks that shape sporting practices, understood from a conventionalist 
39 
40 and transitionalist perspective, are at-once durable and hard won – not ‘mere’ social agreements. 
41 
42 




5  concurrent with the larger sociohistorical forces practice communities are enmeshed. 
46 
47 Some of these conventions, we contend, work quietly in the background and have less normative 
48 
49 import; others, by degree, matter more to the moral life of the practice community at a certain 
50 
51 
time and in a certain place to define what we do and who we are and thus engage those with a 
53 
54 vested interest in a social practice’s normative framework more deeply.  These more normatively 

















3 material conventions, woven into their practice’s socio-historical context, draw participants to 
4 
5 
the community’s activities and often provide the meaning for investing a significant degree of 
7 
8 their personhood and sense of authentic being to its workings. 
9 
10 Furthermore, our second pragmatic turn forcefully addresses the supposed inability of 
11 
12 
social practices to initiate, engage, and make use of criticism of the conventions informing the 
14 
15 community’s normative framework by encouraging and democratizing material convention 
16 
17 problematization.  For practice communities to meaningfully ‘transition’ in the ever-changing 
18 
19 
contexts they are situated within, members and stakeholders alike must constantly activate the 
20 
21 
22 normative process by scrutinizing here and now material conventions. The most vibrant sporting 
23 
24 practice communities embody the spirit of democracy, shedding the ‘need for certainty’ and 
25 
26 instead encourage transparent critical and reconstructive efforts from within its membership and 
27 
28 
beyond. And as Koopman (2009) contends, ‘the actual practices constitutive of [our political 
30 
31 realities] as well as the potential practices latent within them, are the only well-springs of critical 
32 
33 force’ (p.175). 
34 
35 
This holistic and active approach to problematization, we argue, is more in keeping with 
37 
38 the social and historical realities of practice communities. Increasingly sport practices are held 
39 
40 accountable by wider socio-political forces, with an expansion of those considering themselves 
41 
42 
as ‘stakeholders’ in the present and future of sport. Some critical instances begin informally (and 
43 
44 
45 maybe less articulately), eventually invoking a groundswell of support that challenges sporting 
46 
47 institutions to respond. Others are more formalized, with organizations such as the Government 
48 
49 of Canada’s ‘Safe Sport for All’ initiative created to open and widen inquiry related to 
50 
51 
harassment, abuse, and discrimination in sport. Such a pluralistic account requires an on-going 
53 
54 challenge to conventional norms that demands accountability to, and beyond, the inner sanctums 

















3 of sport communities. As Peirce (1998) argues, ‘upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of 
4 
5 
reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn and in so desiring not be satisfied with what 
7 
8 you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed 
9 
10 upon every wall of the city of philosophy, Do not block the way of inquiry’ (p.48).6 
11 
12 
Finally, our third pragmatic turn dismisses a final critique levied against conventionalism: 
14 
15 that it trends towards ethical relativism. The charge of relativism is only valid from an 
16 
17 instrumental perspective if norms at the heart of an intractable dilemma are considered ‘relative’ 
18 
19 
to some fixed, objective idea of ‘true practice’ rather than at-once durably and dynamically 
20 
21 
22 emerging conventions in permeable and overlapping social practices. As Bernstein writes 
23 
24 ‘[Those who claim moral certainty] make use of the grand Either/Or when they attack their 
25 
26 opponents. For they claim that the only alternative to solid foundations and moral certainties is to 
27 
28 
be lost in the quagmire of relativistic opinions’ (Bernstein 2005, p.28). Conversely, by focusing 
30 
31 on the meliorative process engaged in by a community of inquirers and vested participants, the 
32 
33 problem of relativism in effect fades away. 
34 
35 
Therefore the final step in the normative process, understood from our pragmatic 
37 
38 conventionalist perspective, considers the span of possible responses to the problematization of 
39 
40 material conventions.  Such situations matter deeply to a plurality of people investing in a range 
41 
42 
of ways in a sport practice’s meaningful functioning, and thus ‘stand in need of reconstructive 
43 
44 
45 responses – that is why we experience them as problematic’ (Koopman 2009, p.560). The 
46 
47 justified concern related to ‘moral relativism’ is that practice participants will not be normatively 
48 
49 accountable to one another and insulated from critical judgements when formulating responses to 
50 
51 
these kinds of intractable dilemmas. However, communities engaged in a fully normative process 
53 
54 that constantly assesses the materiality of certain conventions in certain contexts, that open space 

















3 for whom and how meaningful conventions might be problematized, that work together toward 
4 
5 
critically-oriented meliorative responses, will ultimately encourage more participant 
7 
8 accountability and moral commitment. Relatedly, Rorty writes, ‘my strategy for escaping the 
9 
10 self-referential difficulties into which “the Relativist” keeps getting himself is to move 
11 
12 
everything over from epistemology and metaphysics to cultural politics, from claims to 
14 





Pragmatism, therefore, offers effective resources to expand and develop a conventionalist 
20 
21 
22 framework for understanding sporting practices and how they might deal with complex 
23 
24 problems.  By focusing on processes that may lead to normative growth in the face of intractable 
25 
26 dilemmas, rather than solutions that seek normative certainty, a pragmatic conventionalist 
27 
28 
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27 1 It is common in the sport philosophy literature to critique the work of Richard Rorty based on secondary 
28 
interpretations, particularly those offered by Michael Burke and Terence Roberts. We are not suggesting 
29 
Burke and Roberts get Rorty ‘wrong’ but that they use his writings in a particular way, emphasizing a 
30 
subjectivist reading of the pragmatist’s work. 
31 2 These classifications mirror Morgan’s (2007) descriptive separation of moral and non-moral (aesthetic, 
32 
prudential) types of values (xvii-xviii). 
33 3 Hilary Putnam (1995) suggests that the basic insight of pragmatism is that ‘one can be both fallibilistic and 
34 
anti-sceptical’ (p.21); Richard Bernstein (1991) argues that pragmatism deeply influenced twentieth century 
35 
philosophy and beyond by dismissing the need to ‘give strong foundational justification in any area in human 
36 
inquiry’ while at the same time distinguishing between ‘better from worse reasons . . . even if what are to 
37 
count as “good reasons” are themselves historically conditioned and contestable’ (p.277); Michael Bacon 
38 
(2012) concludes that pragmatists of all stripes ‘focus on the importance of taking seriously the 
39 
particularities of human practices’ (p.9). 
40 4 See https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/CAS_Executive_Summary  5794_.pdf 
41 5 As Emerson (2014) writes in his essay “Experience”, ‘Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we 
42 
do not know the extremes, and believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs 
43 
below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out 
44 
of sight’ (p.341). 
45 6 Peirce (1998) continues: ‘Although it is better to be methodological in our investigations…there is no 
46 positive sin against logic in trying any theory which may come into our heads, so long as it is adopted in such 
47 a sense as to permit the investigation to go on unimpeded and undiscouraged’ (p.48). 
48 
49 
50 
51 
